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INTRODUCr ION.
During the past eighi years. and espeo-allV i.he cast tnrree
years, a coaiderable number of cases nave risen in ,wioh the
statutory liability cf stocknoiaers in Kansas business cor-
porations has sou ,pt to 1e pniorceo in ,urisoi-.ions otner than
h a S as.o
Qwinhg to the Iargv amoun. oi capi1xl invesstea in &anas
enterprises by non-resioents of that state, th& oeOi ions-nirk -nese
cases are of gxea-. import4nce. In iman instancas, porsons
iesiaing in other sLAtes have inves-ea money in 4ansas dorpora-Lions
whicn nave become' insolvent, owing to improper .ana-gemen.a, ana ieft
,ore or less inaebteoness unp aide creitors bave f :e4uertl
faileQ Lu sazts'ix . ir claims azainst the resident stock-
noloers ana have been uop.eiied to 1oo to the ncn-resiaen
stockholaers,, or ei~s suffer losses. 1ntt question, then, arises
as to whether these or--diiois uan an oie tne labiilty of stocK-
holoers proviae4 by ihe Kanbab stavi4es in a buit Lrou~ht ln -some
other jurIsdiction than Kansas.
"-he restilts reached 1by the various couiLs in trtn6 IQ
oi§1e this problem are both IntrSrezling and impotanL. It
will be the purpose of the writer to set foi th these resuLs in
tne following pages, af'ter first* Goncidrinlg the generai sub-
ject 9.f enforcinp the liability of tiookholders in foreipn
corporations, and also the oarti-c~ia.r piovisions of the Kansas
sta~tuzes in question anro thei.r const.ruction b the couxts oi
kansas.
lhe Enforcement of the Statuto.r Liability o, $-ockhodotrs ln.
Fo.re n Corpoirt~ons.
ihe enforcement 1!' ihe courts of tnv otne-r states o tne
Kansas statutes, defining the lial, iity of stockhoioirs in
Kansas corporaton to corpora'., creoitoxs is, of oourse, a
,opic Lejongr.ng -c -the g-nexai subject of the eiraterritorial
foice given to the statutes of anotrer s.ae. Accoroin .. , a
6tuoy of the Qecisions of various .urisc ctlons which have oeaiL
with the question of enforcing tht statutes of another state,
imposing iiabiiiiies upon 6tockhoiaers of eoxporationv, creat.eQ ita
that state, is of vdiue in showla-, ,n attit.uoe of tne cotr
toward tnis probiei.
In tost of the jurisaictiOns of the uni-ea Statess4alutes
have been enactea making stoc hoiaers of a corpor-ion iiaL1 for
the Qebts of tne corporation to the extent of the amount un-
paiD on their sul:sc- iicons foi siocK of t-m7 copor.a(ion. ;
of "Lhose sLaLutes piovicie foi a furLhe iiabiliLy, .nxch con-
tinues after the ,tochhoidei has ful paid fox his stoc,. ihe
Most common 6Nampie of tne latt r ciass ig the i ab~i,-y to an
at.ouni eoual to tV-,) amouit of 'sto oonk-a hy tne st01o4oe"'se
or the "duie i1ahii~y". 'mis i.s caiio a stat,-,ory iial.iiltY
because it did not exist at common laws
uf course, t.he i ialt.iliy of %L e stocAholoar for the a.ounl
unpaiQ upon his stocx 16 cieai.y enforceable, bnoe tssn l sOK-
holaer must Le demed to na~e coatiacted x.tn .vftatioe co ;nt
principle that ne capi-ai s-ock of tne t ation is a opie-
sentation as to the financri responsibi,.ly of tle cuxporatioi
upon whicn per.ons dea~li ,iun it ma rely. Une wno d eals
with a corporation ann becomes its crenitor has a rdghT to n-
sist that, if th6 corporation .osesses any resources, the re-
sources shall be 4pplG t0 Lho pyment of -tne coipora.e debLs.
If an s Locxholer has no, pals ail of his &uscrip 1on to tn
capital stocA ht snouiQ he compv"elo to paj it cr fol "Lnu
benefit of the creoi-ors of the oonpmatiln, noe th c,-diioib
have reiloe upon the reXeSeltatiOn Ltit rne -pxtion, at
least, possessec the 6apitai stoc4 it claimnva to hate. in
other roias, the unpaid capital stock is iegax~ea as a t rust na
fcr the benefit of the cjelitors of the coi-c,6ation, ato Lhe
for its paymen.t
liabilhuv oi xhe slockhol6 i is a conitractual one.A
'he lia lity wihicn ooritknuez ai.er the stcck is pali- for
is a sort of uarai,ty to hb civcftto, o.'a-
the debts of the cioyir;tion wil be pzao, o a least, ialo vu
a Ce±aifn eXtent. Y- may Lh saia .6U b nt& ul lu its
naiure so far as ii, may be assurneo o ha\, been contemplatea by
thd 6tockhoider ,nen nt; purchased hi ztock. (if oour, ne
stockholder is bounrl t, Aocw the ja . ana enst be presue% io O av,
become a membex of th6 co rporation fully aware of trz fact -,hat -Je
statutes cae provid.od that he shall, i i that case, uaoQrtake
certain iiabilities.
inat r V LuThe nature of Lnrs :extraord" ' litiy ±y ipoa by sta5 te
eeMs 'to hale been -mportaat eI ~ a% ry ca n pL t1,min'i,,6
Ahethor, thv irabli-ys,odhdb enfortcA&, opop1aily outsid. of
the juris( iction where it was imposed. T±he tet; hav
4parata tne lilabi1 Lles of stooi~noiders into iQ Cenai±
classes, the ,ne con-ractuai ann tho oter penal. While it is
held that tre statutes of a s[Ttae o not Gperate eozraterratoc-
iaiiy of tner own force (New na';en Horse Nall Go. v. Linden
Spring Go., 142 $ass. 349), a large number of 1xrisd'otons
-have enforced contractual iiabili1iLes iitoseo by sta-Utes of another
state, a4ihough t ey hn iaft.so to tnfoict punaiLe1 . [A is
distinction between coitractuai anri .ptnal i.L 1ItjS faS L tQn
regarded as very important.
The usual statutory liability of stockholders to the cre-
ditors of the corporation is quite generally held to be a con-
tractual liability. Numerous decisions might be cited in
support of this statement. But a few will suffice to
illustrate what the courts consider to be the nature of the
liability which by statute continues even after the subscript-
ions to the capital stock of the corporations are paid.
In Aultman's Appeal, 98 Pa., 505, Sharswood, C. J., says:
"The defendants became owners of theis stock either by sub-
scription or by assignment from subscribers, and assumed
votuntarily all the obligations imposed upon them as owners.
It was a contract, express or implied to pay not only for the
stocx owned or subscribed, but so much in addition as would be
necessary for the purpose of securing the creditors of the
company. This contract could be enforced in any state in which
the defendants were amenable to the process of the courts.
Upon the construction of tnis statute we are Lound to respect
if not to fojiow itplicitly the decision of the courts oi Ohio."
In Queenan v. Palmer, 117 111. 619,tbe provision of a 1L.ani<
charter, that the stocknolders should "ba respooisible, in their
inoiviaual property, in an amount equal to tne amount of stocK
heid by them, respactiveiy, to mai a good losses to dt9osltois
or othe'rs", was construed not to impose a penaity but a pximary
liability constituting a common funo for the benefi, of rcdLitoisA
The court points out in the opinion that t e lialoiliti was impowdcl
upon the stockholders as a class ana not oeparatel-, as iaivi-
duals ano acas, "The imposition of a penaity is in tnh nature of
punisnment, for wrongful or tortious conduct in an individ ai, ano
Is never ixposed upon a class of persois in the aggre axe, as a
body."
The court, in Dennis V. Superior Court, 91 Cal. 548, says,
"Wo thinx tne personal li4bility of a stocnoider of a corpora-
lion for his proportion of the indebtedness of thv cuipozation is an
obli!ation arising upon contract.-" .On the other hand, thore
are numerous statutes imposing liaLlities wnich are ponal in
their nature.
For example, a statute, ma'ing directors liablo in tntir
individual capacitits for contra-ctina, any debts e'ceeding the
tapital sock a6Tuaii. paid in', was hein to be a penalty in
First National Bank of Fimouth v. I-rioe, 33 Nid. 487- In that
case the directors ano officers contractiag such debts were
jointly ano severally liable in thei.r individual capacities for
the whole amount of ire excess.
Avain, it is heid ir, the Giobe Pubiisning Co. v. Stae BaIIA
of Nebraska, 41 No . 175, that a statute, which provides tnat
until certain things are done by persons forming a corpoiaLlon,
sucn as the filing of its articles of associatlon in tne office ol
a pubiic officer, the stockholders i-n such corporation shail be
liable for the debts thereof, is a penal statute because "ce-
signeo as a punishment of the stockholders". So, in Wiles v.
Suydam , 64 N. 1.173, a similar statute was held a penalty, and it
was pointed out that the statute made the stocvholoers liable
fcr all the debts of the corporation in such a case.
Again, a statute requiring a carporation to kubiasn an
annual statement of its evisting debts ana, for a faliure- o do
so, TaxinZ stockholoers responsible Lor a specif ic class of
demands exisiing prior to or at the -time when such putitication
MoCune
shoula be given was held penal in Cable v. A 26 io. F71.
In Halsey v. McLean, 12 Allen 48, a statuteg ,Aic required
overy company organized unoer i. annu;iii ihin tentV days from
tnd flit Qa of January, to maxe ana pUlin a repk,rt, 6Lair;
Xne amuunt ol its capldi; tne proportion paia in, anQ tn
arouni oi all existing- debts-.anc tnat if oasu of fatloue t0 Qo
Lnis. tnen all ine tc itees uf such a company snouldc t j 4 i
ancA severally liabia foi all tn dolts of tv compaay trnen exstiln,
ana for all that snould le Qontacted Leiore ucr report should
tv made, was regarded as penal by ine couji.
Again, iL Saylos .. Exown, 40 Fea. 8, a statute, ta~in
stoCeholoers of a cormparny joint!A ana seerdiy ]haVIy for hil
the debts of the company in the evtnr of a aj lure To file in 0h
Lown-cierK's office of the town wher- inr manufctory .Nas os-
ta'listed, annually, a certif icate, sitned Uv t:. prsideai
ana a ma.ority o- ie dlrector, truly stati:i6 the arfu1,.fft O1 aii
assesSments vot:a b thi occOlpan, ana actu iiy paid in, an& the
amount of alI exisiing debts, was construed to im.posa a pdaaiI.
Thus, t±- cases Take plain the fact that a pcal staLute
is "one whion vmp,-,ses a fofei-ture 6r penalty for .ransgres sng
iLs trovisions, or for ,ioinc a thinc rroiibited." As SroLI,
J, I., in Oueenan v. r-almer, 117 I1. 619, says, 'The imposition
of a penalty is in the nature of a punisnment, for nronjiui or
tortious conduct in an individuai, ano is never imposed upon a
class of persons in the a -regate, as a body."
It is a very geiieraliy accepted ruie that if the liability
imposed by the statute is penai in nature it wili not, be enforQed
outside of the Jurisdiction in whicl it was enacted. Thus, in
Derrickson v . Siritn, 27 K. J. Law 166, the court says, "inis
being a suit to enforce a penalty inftitd L a statuta of the
state of New York, it is clear that it cannot be enforced in this
state. Penal la,6 are strictly local, and affect nothing more
than they can reach.'
In the case of Hunilngton v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 6.7 the
question as to what constitutes a penal staLute which cannot be
enfofced in the courts of anothur state i. discussed ano an
important distinction is pointed out. qr. Justice GQay says:
"The test whetrier a law is penai in tne strict a4fl prim.ry sease,
is whther tne wrong sought to be redrassed is a wrong to the
public, or a wrong to the indiviaual ....... ,.. The provisioa of
the statute of Now iork, now in quostion, making the officers of
a corporation, wrio sign ano rocoro a false certificate of tha
amount of i capital stock, liable for all its debts, is in no
sense SL criminal or guasl-orifiinai iaw. ............ As the
statute imposes a burdensome iability on the offic&'s for tneir
wrongfui act, it may wellt be considered penal, in the sense that
it srould be, strictly construed. But as it gives a civil
remedy, at the suit of the cidditor oily, ano measured by tne
amount of nis debt, it is as to nim clearly re,aediai. 1o a,aia-
tain such a suit is not to administer a pinisniient impobed upon
an offender against the state, but simply to enforce a private
right secured uner its iaN to an individual. We can ee no
just ground, on principle, for hoioinc such a statute to be a
penal law, in the sense that ii cannot be :.,aforced In a
foreign state or country." Accordingly iL was decided that' in
case tna; a Judgment obtained against the defenoant in New
York uncer the New York statute referred 4o ought to bo enforced
by the courts of aryiand. Inis same question camie ' eiore tne
Privy Councii of Engiana a few montns eariier in the asa 01
Huntington v. Attrill, 1893, A. G. 150, as the p.aintiff had
sought to enforce his judgment against tnd defencant in uanaca:
ano it was held that the action was to enforce a liability m-
posed f(,r the protection of private richis aQ,,a -,was reaeoial ari
not penal in the sense of being '.,ithin V .a ruie of 3,ntrnat-onai
law which prevdnts the courts of one country Ixom exocuting tthe
penal laws of another, or enforcing penaities recoverabie by
the state. This doctrine if applied to maity of the crases in-
Vulvinf statutes whicn nave been Gunsiaeraa penal ana un-
• .aiiyw
enforceable etraitrritor^ wouid undoubLedly produce an opposite
A
holding from the one nhich obtaiabd Ufniess this decision bb
,iinid on.y to cases where a judmeat aiidy obtai-ned is
sousht to be enfoicud.
As io tiL±e viCorc,bn- of h,, staiuto. of a±r~a
duci he \b V, "uLxsect , of-this Go,,ttry Qo rv L sea;:,
Lu be ur,±fu.j,, aric no- ix." ]e differf rce (.-f ,,pil n is ;fan festeO.
Some iuiisdictions nave uniformly enfurced such a liability
ittbpued Ly tnh statutes of anothei state.
-Ina fedeiai couits nave invariabiy itaintained tots doo-rline.
For example, in Flash v. Conn 109 U.S. 871, where an action had
been brought, in hd firsL instance, in Fiordia to enforce
stockholder's iiabliLy under a New iuor statute, Ln. z,.rt,
after declaring tnat th action wa, no, brougnht -,o vnfu±,e a
penalty, says, "Ino right of the plaintiffs to sue upoi Lne
iialiiity in any court haNi,i ur-solcti,.. of the sujet-r:atter
a,,d the parties is, trerefore, cieir."
The Supro e Court of ualifornia in tn:e case of Fer. uson v.
Snermian, 116 Gal. 169 neld that trie statute of anotner state,
providing for a co 1tractuai iial-'iliy un tne paft of s-Lockholdai
wnicn is not ponai in i-s fatucv and does not depend fur itb
unforcemeat upon remedies pecuLiar to t,- couzits o tne state
whicn created tne iialilty and waiach is enforceabiu in an
action at law ty ?. ludgmvnt creditor of tnd coiporation in the
state whore tho corporation *as cuated, after returr, of exeou-
tion unsatisfied acaia.,t the corporation, will be ai, force- in
California.
In Gonnectiout d similr rule ste'rf LO provail. In tne
castj of Paine v. Stewart, 8$ Conn. 516, a statute of tne state
of Mirtnescta, imposiag the usual douboe a'Lility upon ,tock-
holders in MVinuaosuta 'Lnks, has vnforcod.
In -vorgia, -tno -4su of huaWxQ v. t.inn, 8b (a. 238, 4hiio
not precisely in point n:--' an authority on this question
setrms to warrant the inferenoe that stockholder's contrrctual
liability incurreo unoer the statute of anotner staLe wil be
enforce'l in I keorgia. In tnat case, toe crediiors of an
insoiveni. +rg iia Corpoiation sougnL to cLiie(A an I jSeif l
upon the d-,rjndanLt's snorus of stcv anct a uCfiiorfl iot the
Piaintil was affirmud. A sin.aiar decision is £ounG in
Iorrxs v. uann, 87 Aia. 628, which involved the same qu.stion.
In iowa, tne highest cOUtL of that state in -he case oi
Latimer and Ingles v. Sta- e Earsk, 102 Iowa 162,enf)rced ihe
inadivicual liabili-y, tv the amount unpaid on the shares of
stockoiaerso impused by a s~tute of Soutn Daota, as tne stattu,
neitnur provided a specai reaeOy nor creaato a exclusive
s-Lautory iiability, but pra&Lioaii- left " cr editor Lu the
same form of actioa tnaL he ou.a have brougn if there nrc
no statute"el
The opinion of Johnston, J. in the case of Huweli V. Iaigies-
dorf, 33 Kan. 194, coitains this suaLtPMk.UL, "While tha liablily
is statutory, it is one which arises uoon the contract of sbb-
scription to the capital stock of the corporation, and an action
to enforce the same is transitory, and mdy Le LIought in ine
sLate whoio i rsonal sorvce (an Lo maoe ."pon %ro stocknoiders."
This dictum cl arly irdiatus the puo-tfiui uf the Suprtei:t cuurt
of Kansas.
In Ylicnigan, a vtry rtotit case, Western NaTfonai Bank oi
New tork v. Lawr"-nce, 76 k. W. Rep. 105 (1b8Y" held that a
creditor of ta loreign Gorpoiai.iun, mign- bting a, actIon in trn
courts uf -,:icnigahi , eufd.jice a liab rity pio-ided' by tne s'a-,ute
of tho other state, makin . a siocKholder lia-le for the dctts of
tho iiasol' nx corporation for an amount equal to his stock.
LiKewise, the Supreme ourt of iiiisota  the case of
First National Bank v. Gustin, etc. Pining Go., 42 minn. 327
unfuXced a similar liability imposeo by the is ol DiKota.
So, in eissouri a liaLi.iity of this nature has bu,
enfoxced upolt more than one oc(.'asion.- In Hodgs~n v. Gheever,
8 mo. App. b, it is said, "The same c;rmity thicrt allows the
corporations of this state to sue in otner ztaies upon contractb
made unoer our laws, anG not ijn,,oral or againsT public policy,
should induce tn courts of tnls state to afforo a rtr.-eo- wnere
a citizen ui this state undertaKes obli 5 ations iwpubei b the
iaws of another state, wnch are not ripugrant o good uforais
or our policy."
In Now zorx the Ioctrine is, tnat wrnil spe,,iai idiodiob
provided by foreign laws to vaforce toe iiaitiiilv of stooK-
rtoiders in f.oreign coiporations must be appiieo Ly the courts
of the state in tioe iocai jurisdiction ana -vntre the cutpoxation
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is domiciiec. yet if the ; of thx legi-ilaure was to Irm
p<s a, absolutu, ptrsonai lia, i.3-ty on stookhoiders Lr.io staut -
0± tnte fLjuigai juriS~btitioi ma Ll gLvu exirraerriioraai fuioe:
1owery v. -Inman , 46 N. Y. 119. In tnat case tne court in
speakici of statutes, irr:..osinz :,ucn an ahsolui 1i Liiity,
declares tnat thneir ",alidity, interpretatiorn aii effect are t.
be aeterminea by the lex loci buL, tn remedy is governed by tie
TOi f o r." Such a statute was construed :i Ex_ are ianRiper
Riper, 20 Wund. 614, where the charter of a New Jersey bank
sougnh- to be enforced was held nox to confine tnh creditor to
any par~icular r ,mudy.
In Oregon, tntv aoctririe seems to be much -he sar;-i as thIat
of tie New tork courts. So, in Aldrich v. Anchor Goal 6o.,
24 Ore.,, 32, it was heid that whoru ntn statute simpiy/ ciaies
the liability, leaving tht creditor to aeyect n  oomon-ia'
remedy tie may Cunsiael apprupria-e, the right so given MOy be
enforoea by a common-law action in any court taving jurisdiction
of the sublect matter ana the partivs. Accoraingly, ,ho court
unforced a statute of Calijoinia -hr:h maoe each stockhoide
personally and inaivicually liablie for such proportLion of each
dobt or ciaim againsL' 'he citoy.tion as tle anount .,f ris ;tock
shouid bear io A wholo subsoctiLed Gital stcA .
The Suprome Court of unnsyivania in Auitaran's iippta., 98
?a. 8059 htid tnat it had JurisdioCion to eaforo Lhv provisions
of the iaws of the state of Ohio maKlng stocKhoiders personaliy
iiabie to creditors of tho corporation in an amIount equal to the
stocK subscribed by tnvm, since it was nut a ptnalty. T).s
ductiine is iurther supporto in Cusning v. Perot 176 Fa. 66.
Tne attitude of the Supreax Court of Thnnessee .,ay 6e
understood fro& a dictum in Wooos v.. WicKs, 7 Lea 40, wnjre it
4s sala, "If the liability is in tne nature of a ontract, aud
is not opposed to the legislation or public policy of tn 6tato
in which it is sought to be enforced, the courts wili enforce it."
But the particuiar statute cons-ruvd in ihaL caa was a prnal one.
On txe other band th dt-cisions of s,-v-7ral jurlso)ctions
have been so uniformly opposed to ecforcinc- Tn! statutory ila-"
bility of stocknolders in foreign torporations that tney have come
to be regdroed as denying the rignt of creditors in bucn corpor-
ations o enforco tneir clals outsl-des of Tnb sovi' ig,,y I i-
pusing ino liability.
qInUs, in Iil-nois ii tno uas ! f iattersun v. Lynde, 11e
Ill. 196, a demurrer to a viii fii,)a by crediors of an isuievent
lb
corporation of the state uf Oregon against ctrLai, s-oc,,noiders
was su!tained, on the groura that it was iifpossi'le to acquire
jurisdiction of th% corperationgs, anc tr,. non-rPiidnt stook-
hoiddrb L4aQ no pIQ-rTy in lIiirwi. . In Young :. Farwell
139 Ili. 326, it was decided that the creditoi of -'h fureign
corpoiaiion shoulu firsi, seek a remedy in tn 'Le unoer tno i4
oi which xha coip.ratlun ,vab oianized.
The Quctrine' of the Massacnu-setts'co-ILs is, trE4 -iflt e-
tent of the s xochoiaer' s iiabili ty, Lhe manner of its cn-
forcaent, an tne siatus of the stocKholders must be determinvdA
by the laws of tie state where trne cozporation is doomiciiud,
ari Ey tb, courts of that st~t&. Aris re'a-or f,, t'rs is that
th action to enforc , such a liability is one , ich invoivi's
the relati.jns bot*en the stoc.nrwiders of the foreign co-porataon
ana in wniot- c.omple eiusLi(c , can Le done' only by tne oer.
of the sovd'r,:ignzy whoro -n~ coipoiatioi, *as Qreatb d, dna, i
some cases, tne dn itIrCaner1 of : no ioreign iaw woic b al.ariuU
to citize'ns of Massachusetts: Erickson v. Ns-smth, 4 Alien 233;
Ne'w Haven horse Nail Co. v. Linden Soring eo, 142 ,Iass. 34d;and
Bank of North America v,-. Rlndge, 14 mass. 203 supjort -his
dootrine.
In New Hampshire' it has been nold tnat comity uia not r--
Quiro .h court to give effact to ton st4lutes of Onio in a
case whrv a cr oitor of an ^o.io Oorporationl, ,nicr raf ro asse.Ts
or btockholoers rvsoing in Nai Hampshire. filea a bill to en-
force th inciviaui ilibility of stocKhoicers, tne bilJ cuntainlng
no recitei of tnv remidaia process by wnicn tnat iiabiiity was
enforced in Cnio. Eing a inout inforrnaxon as to tn rooy,
rino court feare tiat i-6 might affora a ro,,oy w nion w adil,"Q
to persons in Ohio ano wnicn wouia be aenioea to prsons svAifng
to enforce simiiax right unoer the New Hampshire iaws: Rico v.
Hosiery Lo.9 66 N. h. 114.
The highest court of West irginia foilows the Massaahusetts'
doctrine in Nimick and 6o. v. Iron Works, 2& W. 'a. 184, by
hoiding that a bill in equity, to ascertain and d~termije the
extent of, tnu inaiviouai liability of a stocinolaer in a cor-
poration organizva unoer tne laws of Uhio, coula ,-t be sustaineu
in trce courts of 6st iriginia.
From this brivf urvey of Tnu p ositLun o td various
jurisoictions on the subict of eaf,)rcing foreigii .Iatuies im-
posing a personal or ii~mstri.l liability on stoc holo:rs of
corpoiatois, it is dvlaent -hat a iassiiioation wnich iz fouaoo [
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merely upon jurisoictions a:, a basis is hot -ntirtiy , atisfac-,ory.
Ahether such statutes wii! be oniuceo ,beefrfs "o opec. upon sevral
conserations, such as, wnorJihr any in.jury wili b done to tri
ci0i,'ens of tne state Ti which they aro sougrt to be enforced,
,^hotner ino poicy of its ow;, laws wiLj bb couhutaviohd or im-
paired anr whnehr its courts are opable of Join- Goupiute
,1ustice to tnov liabi to be aff. ctd by tnoir decrees.
It sould be noted, -.moreovai, tnat a coisjaerable iiumber of
authoritits lay down -trne important rule tnat, special remeJies
providiin: for th,, vnforcemen-i, of zhi individual liabijity of tht
btoConolders, cceated by xno ows of a siate, must b0 entforcAd 1,y
th courts of tiat sitai exciusivuiy, aiurougr if no rambao i
proscriled th iibjiiiy may be enforced whorever Lnu persuu is
f.ound, if tn6 ilabiiity is, uf cuurse, nut penlci. Ine following
oases )llustrate tnis rUie: Russuil v. ?aoif.i rxaliway Jo.,
113 Cal.258, where th, statute of Illinois authorizod 0. proceeding
against stocKhoiders similar to thd in cases of garnishlmenL;
Fowler v. Lamson, 146 Ill., 472, .here the s-,axjxa of Kangas
erfnitted roditLors of insolvent cor-oratio)ns wuose *eoution
against its i roserty ha., be returned urwiatisfiea to have
ex 0ution against -to stockholders on tne juaijrent a:ainst the
the corv&Qratioa. Eriokson v. Nesimith, 4 Alien 2F", wher the obly
remedy -iven to creditors of ah insolvent corporation by the
New Hampshire statute was a bill in e-uity; Lowry v. Tre'ran,
45 N.Y, 119, where a Georgia statute provided that a judg.[fn-
and execution against the corporation should be a lien upon, ana
be enforced. against the individual property of the stockholders
made liable by the actj Christensen v. Sno, 106 N. Y. 97, where
a statute of Missouri authoriz.ed a creditor of a CQrporation,
whose execution upon judgment against the corroration had been
returned Unsatisfied, to issue execution thereon against any
stockholder to the extent of the amount of stock held by hinm to-
gether with any amount Vnlaid thereon: May v. black, 77 Wis.
101, where the constitution of Michigan provided that the stoc-
holders' liability for all labor perform.ed for a corporation
might be enforced by an aetion in assuinps it . It has been said
that the remedy does not enter into the contract itselft and for
this reasoh the individual liability of stockholders can only be
enforced by the remedies provided by the law ot the forum
First Nat. Bank v. ustin, etc. Mining Co., 4 Minn. 327.
In brief, it may be said that one who becomes a stockholder
in a corporation organized under the laws of a foreign state, is
deemed to have cont'racted with reference to those laws and the
extent of his liability is to be determined by those laws.
acting ex comitate andThe courts of other states 1i' f-6 exercise of sound legal dis-A l
cretion will enforce such foreign laws, imposing a liability
upon the stockholder, crovided the liability is not penal nor
opposed to the legislation and purlic policy of the state in
which it is sought to be enforced. But while the right conferred
by the foreign law will be enforcedia peculiar or special remedy
prescribed thereby will not be given extraterritorial force but
must be ernflned:-An Its operation to the limits of the sovereignty
where it was created.
CHAPTER II.
The Kansas Statutes and their Interpretation by the Qourts
of that State.
Turning from the survey of the broad topic to the narrower
one under consideration, the Kansas statutes in juestion must
be next taken up.
The sections of the Kansas corporation law which define the
liability of stockholders in Kansas business corporations and
provide for the manner of enforcing this liability are to be
found in chapter twenty-three of the Kansas Ceneral Statutes,
which went into effect October 31, 1868, and remain ' practically
unchanged to-day. They are as follows:
§32 (50, C. 66, Gen. Ste 1897) "EXECUTION AGAINST SIO0K-
HOLDERS:ACTiVN. If any execution shall have been issued against
the property or effects of a corporation, except a railway, or a
religious, or a charitable corporation, and there cannot be
found any property whereon to levy such execution, the execution
against
may be issued any of the stockholders, to any extent equal
A
am ounTit 1. hL ~c -- -t -Wf s .c~ kby ~ r z% ; tQ.ot>, -. a
.... . ..:0 p..; but io *-4oti, snail issue against
any stockho,Ir except upon an orov ul tht court LAi i,,n L,
t
action, suit, or proceedings shall have been DrouLht or in-
stitutea, maad upon motion in open court, after re . onable
notice iii writing to the person or persons iought to be cnar.4ra;
aia, upon sucn mo tirii, such court may orajr excu tion to issue
accoiingly; or the plaintiff in the execution may proceed by
action to char-e the stocholders with the amount of his judgment
men t."
046 (65l, C. 66, Cen. Dt. Ib@7) 'LIABILITY. No stock-
holder shall be liable to pay debts of tht corporation, be-
yond the amount due on his stoc., ana an additional amount
e-..ual to the stoc- owned by him."
'40, as amenaed, Laws 1883, C. 46, 1 , (945 Ch. 66,
Gen. St. 1897) "HOW DISSOLVED. A corporation is dissolved,
first, by the expiration of the time limited in its charter;
second, by a judgment of dissolution rendered by a court of
competent urisdiction; but any such corporation shall )e
deemed to be dissolved, for the purpose of enabling auy crvoitors
of such corporations to prosecute suits against stoc hoiders
thereof to enforce their inaivioual liability, if it be
shown that such corporation has suspended business for more
than one year, or that any corporation now so suspended
froit uusiness shall for three months after th passage of this
act fall to resume the usual and orainary business."
944 (649, Oh. 66, Qen. St. 1897). "ACTION A(;AINST
STOCI\HOLDERS. If any corporation, created under this or
any general statute of this state, except railway, or cnari-
table, or religious corporation,0ue dissolved, leaving deots
unpaid, suits may be crought against any person or persois
who were stodKholders at the time of such dissolution, without
oininri the corporation in such suit; and ii udgment te
rendered, a:,d execution satisfied, the defeadant or defendants
may sue all who were stockholdiurs at the time of dissolution,
for thk recovtry of the portion ol 6ucrn nebt for which they
were liable, and the execution upon the ,udment shall direct
the collection to be made from property of each stockholder,
respectively; and if any number of stocxholders (defendants
in the case) shall hat have property enough to satisfy his
or their portion of the executlon, then the amount of de-
ficiency shall be divided equally aiitong all the reiiiaining
stocxholders, aud collection made accordingly, deducting
from the amount a sum in prourtion to the amount of stoc.,
owned by the plaintiff at the time the company dissolveci."
945 (953, Ch. 66, Gea. St. 1897). "CONTRIBUTION. If
any stockholder pay more than his due proportion of any debt
of the corporation, he may compel contribhtion from the other
stock, holders by action."
633 (062, Ch. 66, Gen. St. 1897) . "NAMES FURNISHED.
The clerx or other officer having charge of the boocof any
company, oi demand of the plaintiff in any execution against
the company, his agent or attorney, shall furnish such
plaintiff, his agent or attorney with the names and places of
residvnce of the stocholders (so far as nown) and the amount
of stock held by each, as shown by tne boots of the company-"
The Constitution of the State of Aansas also provides for
securing the payment of corporate deets, as follows: "Dues
from corporations shall L-e secired by individual liaLility of
the stockholders to an additional amount equal to the stock.
owned by each stoc.holder; and such other means as snali b6
provided by law; but such individual liabilities shall not
apply to railroad corporations, nor corporations for religious
or charitable purposes." (Act. XII, S2).
The statutes have been uniformly sustained by the
Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals of the state of
nansas, as will be seen from a review of the cases which
have come before those courts for a co;istruct ion of the comity
statutes.
A large number of these cases have involved the applica-
tion of the provisions of section thirty-two of the General
Statutes of 1868, as will [-e seen from the following cases.
In Hentig v. James, 22 Aan. 326, it was said that the
proceeding to obtain an execution upon notice and motion is
"a special proceeding, limited in character and does not
convey with it all the powers of a judgment. It assimilates
to proceedings of garnishment, but allows the assistance of
an action to rzcover the amount ordered to be paid. The
amount charged against the stockholder is not a lien in real
estate under order of the court until a levy is made after the
execution."
In Howell v. Manglesdorf, 33 an. 194, is found the
following statement as to the two remedies for enforcing
the individual liability of stockholders: "In the one case,
the judgment creditors of an insolvent corporation may
proceed by a summary action on .iotion in the court where
the judgment was renaered against the corvoration; in the
other by an ordinary action to be instituted wherever
personal. jurisdictioa of the stocxholders can be acquired.
bbfore the summary proceeding by iotion can be maintained,
notice to the stockholder must be -iven, in order that he may
appear and make such defense as can be made and as is
necessary to protect his interest. The statute does not de-
fine the form of the notice nor the time nor place of its
service, but only prescribes that a "reasonale notice in
writing" shall be given to the person sought to be charged.
While the proceeding is summary in its character
and its maintenance contingent upon the insolvency of the
corporation, or upon the rendition of a judgment against
the corporation and the return of an execution thereon of
nulla bona, yet we cannot regard it as an interlocutory or
auxiliary proceeding in the action against the corporation.
In the action against the corporation no notice oi its
pendency is given to the stockholder; he is not directly
interested in the action, as his liability is only secon-
dary to the corporation and exists alone by reason of
this statutory provision, and of that provision of the G3n-
stitution in pursuance of which the statute is enacted
(Const., art. 12, 62). His liability to the creditors of
the curporation is in the nature of a guaranty; the action
or proceeding to enforce the same does not accrue until the
execution upon the, Judgment a;ainst the principal is re-
turned unsatisfied. Wo thin. that the proceeding against the
stockholder, whatever re.iiedy may be employed, is an in-
dependent one. It will readily be conceded if the proceeding
is distinct and independent, the issues between the parties
are personal, and if the consequence of the proceeding is
in the nature of a. iudgment in 22.1. Dsn , that the,) notice or
process o1 the court upon which the jiurisdiction depends
cannot be served beyond the ,urisdiction of the state. Be-
fore either of the remedies pointed out by the statute can be
employed by the creditors, the stockholder must be brought
into court and have his cay there. He is not concluded by
the. udginent aaainst the corporation; that judgment is at most
only prima facie evidence of his liability.
In Wells v. Robb, 43 Kan. 201, it was stated that the
.udgment creditors of an insolvent corporation who first moves
to. char-e a stocxholder of the corporation on his liability
under the statute acquires a priority of right to recover
against such stockholder with which a creditor susequently
movin cannot rightfully interfere.
In Hoyt v. ounxer, 50 r aa. 574, it was heid that
4udgment creditors of acorporation seeking the enforcement
of their rights against stoc, holders thereof must strictly
comply *ith the terms of the statute requiring the judgment
creditors of a corporation to pursue the roperty of the
corporation as long as any property thereof can be found upon
which anx execution can be levied, before resorting to the
proceeain-, therein provided against the stockholders. So,
in Lumber Co. v. Neal, 3 ian. Q =- App. 399, it was asserted that
the courthas no power to entertain a motion for an order
allowin- execution ggainst a stockholder of a company until
tht record of the case in which the motion is made shows that
the corporate property has been exhausted.
The case of Van Demarx v. carons, 52 Aan. 779, furnishes
the rule that the liability of a stoc:iholder in a corporation
against whom an execution may be issued, accordin. to the
.ansas statutes, is measured by the number of shares held by
him at the time the execution became operative; and a
fide transfer of the stock terminates the liability.
In McClelland v. Cragun, 54 Xan. 599, it was held that
a motion made 'for execution against a stockholder of a corpora-
tion can be made only in the court where the judgment against
the company was rendered and from which execution on such
judgment miiht issue. A notice ol notion for execution against
a stoc.holder for a corporate debt, which states the nature of
the olter to Le applied for, and the names of the parties,
the court, and the place of application duly served by a con-
stable is sufficient to confer ,urisdiction. Notice of
a motion for execution in such case may be served on a stoc.,-
holderin any county in the state.
The cases of Merrill v. Meade, 6 Kan. App. 620 arnd
beers v. bunker, 6 -Kan. App.697, both support the proposition
that no lianility for the debts of a corporation can be
enforced against a stockholder until judgment upon the debts
has been rendered against the corporation and an execution
issued thereon and returnee nulla bona, or until the cor-
poration has ceen dissolved or has suspended business for
more than one year.
The majority of the court iB the case of Musgrave v.
Glen Elder Association, 5 Kan. App. 393, decided that in a
proceeding by a creditor of a corporation against a stock-
holder in the same under the statute (N32, C. 23, Gen. St.
1868) making the stockholder liable to corporate creditors
to the extent of his stock, the stocKholder might set off
such claims as he had paid on execution; that as a matter
of e~uity he is entitled to set off the amount oi the first
debts of the corporation which he has voluntarily paid to
a creditor; and that where the stockholders is himself a
creditor of the insolvent corporation, he will be permitteu
in equity to plead the indebtedness of the corporation to
himself as a set-off against his liability to other creditors.
The case of Ball v. Reese, 58 Kan. 614 is authority for
the proposition, that In a proceeding to enforce the indi-
vidual liability of a stockholder, a j.udgment against the
corporation, rendered by a court having Jurisdiction, will,
in the absence of fraud and collusion, be deemea to be
final and conclusive as to the amount of the indebtedness
and the liability of the corporation to pay the same.
The section which relates to how a corporation is dis-solved.
(S40, C. 23, Gen. St. 186@), is construed in the case of
valley Banx v. Congregational Sevviia- Society, 28 san. 4:3.
In this case the petitioners alledged that the defendant
corporation had long ceased to do business and was insolvent.
The court deemed this allegation sufficient to authorize the
commencement of an action for the dissolution of the corpora-
tion,,but as no such action had been orought and it did not ap-
pear that the corporation was dissolved.,the court declared
that the stockholders were not primarily liable to the cre-
ditors of the bank for its debts. "A statement that a cor-
poration has ceased to transact business and is insolvent is
not equivalent to an allegation that the corporation is dis-
solved." It is stated in tte opinion that a corporation is
dissolved - "First, by the expiration of the time limited in
its charter; second, by a judgment of dissolution rendered
by a court of competent ;urisdiction."
SpeaKing of this provision of the Atatute as to corpora-
tion, which has suspended business for more than one year next
preceding the commencing the action, betng deemed to be dis-
solved, for the purpose, of enabling a creditor to enforce
the liability of a stockholder, the court in Dawson v. Shol-
ley, 4 kan. App. 367, says, "It may be conceded that outside
of a statutory provision there is not a general rule, but our
legislature has seen fit to create this statutory liability,
and stockholders in the corporations governed thereby must
be presumed to purchase their shares witn full Knowledge of the
obligations resting upon them."
An illustration of the action by creditors against
stockholders of a corporation which has been dissolved, leav-
in,: debts unpaid (044, C. 23, Gen. St. 1868), is furnished
in the case of Abbey v. Dry Good& Co., 44 Kan. 415, in which
the liability of the stockholders of a corporation, which had
been dissolved, was sought to ce fixed. The court held
that under the statute (S44) the liability of the stockholders
to the corporate creditors is several and not joint, and
each must be sued separately, as the liability might be for
dilferent sums, and each stockholder might have a separate
and distinct defense. This decision is approved in
Howell v. National Bank, 52 Kan. 133. And in Dawson v. Shol
ley, 4 Kan. App. 367, it is held that this section ( 44)
creates a primary liability, thus making the stockholders
primarily liable in the aiount -rovided by the statute for
the unpaid corporate debts.
In Clevenger v. Hansen, 44 Xan. 182, it was held that
where two or more suits are commenced, under the section (644),
and judgments are obtained in such suits at the same term,
and executions are issued thereon during the term in which
the judgment was rendered or within ten days thereafter,
the funa raisea theron, or upon anyone of such executions,
must be distributed pro rata among all such execution cre-
ditors.
The other sections of the corporation law which have
been set forth do not need illustration in this connection
and tne constitutional provision (Art. 12, 02) has already
been referred to in the extract from the opinion in Howell
v. Manglesdorf, 33 Kan. 194.
From the foregoing examination of the Kansas statutes
and decisions it is apparent that the statutory liarility
of stockholders in Kansas corporations is regarded as a
guaranty for the payment of the corporate debts. To en-
force this liability, the corporate creditor who has ob-
tained judgment against the corporation and taken execution
thereon which is returned nulla bona, may proceed by a
summary action on motion in the court where the jludgment was
rendered, after a reasonable notice in .riting to the person
or persons sought to be held liable; and upon such motion
the court may order execution to issue aginst any of the stock-
holders to an extent equal in amount to the stoc owned by such
stoczholder, together with any amount unpaid thereon; or the
j ndgment creditor may proceed by ordinary action to charge
the stocKholders with the amount of the judgment obtained
against the corporation. But, before proceeding against
the stockholders, the creditors must first exhaust the pro-
perty of the corporation. Furthermore, if a corporation
has been formally dissolved, or be deemed to be dissolved
by reason of having suspended business for more than one
year, leaving debts unpaid, the creditors of the corpora-
tion may sue all persons who were stockholders at the time
of the dissolution, without joining the corporation in such
action; but each stockholder must be sued separately.-- The
stockholder in such case may set off any sums which he has
already paid on execution on account of the debts of the
corporation. If, however, one stocKholder pays more than
his due proportion of the corporate debts he may compel con-
tribution from the other stockholders.
CHAPTER III0
Decisions by the Courts of other States upon the Lia-
bility of Stookholders in Kaasas Corporations.
During the past few years, actions have been brought in
several jurisdictions outside of the state of Kansas to en-
force the liability of stockholders in Kansas corporations.
upon or,
Desides the federal courts, decisionsrelating to these
statutes now exist in the following jurisdictions: Cali-
fornia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. An examination
of the decisions of these jurisdictions upon this subot will
reveal the attitude of each toward the question.
While the extraterritorial enforceitent of these Kansas
sttatues has not yet been decided in a case before tne
Supreme Court of the United States, several cases of this
and Circuit Courts
sort have been decided by the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
Thus, in BanK of North America v. Rindge, 57 Fed. 279,
a creditor of a Kansas banking corporation was permitted, in
an action at law brought in the Southern District of Cal-
ifornia, to enforce the liability of a stockholder in the
bank under g32 C. 23 of the General Statutes of 1868 of
Xansas. It was held that under this statute the creditor
may either proceed summarily in the court where judgment
has been given against the corporation and execution re-
turned nulla bona, or he may proceed by an ordinary action
at law wherever personal jurisdiction of such stockholder
can bd acquired. Howell v. Mangelsdorf, 33 Kan. 194, was
-app roved.
In Rhodes v. United States Nat. Bank, 66 Fed. 512, the
plaintiff, a Kansas corporation, was permitted, to enforce,
in an action of assumpsit against a citizen of Illinois, a
stocK liability under the laws of Xansas relating to stock-
holders in insolvent corporations of that state. The
court points out that "the effect of the decisions in i(an-
sas is that the statute (932, Ch. 32, Qen. St. 1868) creates
and enforces a personal liability upon every stockholder
to an amount equal to the amount of stock owned by him, that
such liability is several and not joint, that it exists in
favor of each creditor of the corporation sev)erally against
each shareholder, and that the obligation is by contract in
the nature of a guaranty, and may ce enforced by an action
in any tribunal where proper service can be had."
In Mc ickar v. Jones, 70 Fed. 754, the liability im-
posed by the iansas statute ('32, C. 23, Gen. St. 1868) was
held to be enforceable in a federal court sitting in New
Hampshire; and that the procedure for thu enforcenent of such
liability in a federal court should conform somewhat to the
moae of enforcement in the state where the liability is
created. It was also held that it is not necessary in such
an action that other stockholders within the jurisdiction
should be joined as parties, or that it should be averred
that there are no other stockholders than the defendant
within the jurisdiction; nor is it necessary in such an action
to aver that there is at the time of bringing suit no pro-
perty of the corporation sufficient to satisfy the execution,
nor that the corporation has never been dissolved nor that
the plaintiff is not a stockholder.
The Circuit Court for the Southern District of New
York in the case of National Banx of Oxford v. Whitman, 76
Fed. 697, also held the stocxholders' liability, provided
for by the constitution (Art. 12, S2) and the statute (S32,
Ch. 23, Gen. St. 1868) of ansas, to be enforcear'le in an
action brought outside the state of Kansas. The court follow-
ed Howell v. Manglesdorf, supra, and, among other things,
said: "The action itself is personal; no special proceedings
are provided for in it; and according to the decisions of the
S ,preme Court of the United States, it would appear to be
transitory." The court asserted that the refusal of the
New York courts to assume -jurisdiction in such a case can-
not taxe from the federal court that which properly belongs
to it.
The defendant in this last case brought to the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; but the judg-
ment of the lower court was affirmed. The opinion of the
appellate triounal, which is to be found in Whitman v.
National Bani, of Oxford, 83 Fed. 289, discusses the kansas
statutes in question and reviews many of the leading de-
cisions of various state courts upon this subject. The
court asserts that as the Kansas statute is not penal it
is unimportant whether the liability is called statutory or
one based upon contract. "It is statutory r;ecause it did
not exist at common law, and it is contractual because
reveryone who becomes a member of the company by subscribing to
its stock assums this liability.'" It is furthermore
pointed out that two modes of procedure are provided by the
statate*- one of a summary character, which can be used in
the case of resident stocxholders, but which is useless
against non-residents:sthe other of a transitory character,
so that creditors may not loose the benefit of the constitutional
provision for their protection, against non-resident stoc -
holders.
In the case of American Freehold Land-Mortgage Co. v.
Woodworth, 79 Fed. 951, where an action at law was brought
in a United States Circuit Court in New Yor, to charge a
stockholder in a .ansas corporation, under the Kansas statute,
to the extent of his liability, with a judgment against the
corporation recorded in a federal court in Kansas, it was
held sufficient to alledge the recovery of the Judgment and
the return of the execution thereon unsatisfied, without
averring the original debt, as the Kansas statute makes the
judgment at least presumptive evidence; and that it is im-
material that the New Yor courts in similar cases require
the original debt to ce recited, as that question is one
of proof, and not of pleading;
The United States Circuit Court for the district of Kansas,
in the case of New York Life Ins. Co. v. Beard, 80 Fed. 66,
entertained a bill in equity in the nature of a creditors'
bill, on behalf of the complainant and such other creditors
of the defendant corporation as might desire to join in the
suit to enforce the double liability under the _ansas
statute of a number of the stockholders of a Xansas corpora-
tion, and also the liability for unpaid stock. It was held
that the provision of the K(ansas statute (Gen. St. Aan. Ch. 23,
S32), permitting a judgment creditor after return of execution
against the corporation unsatisfied to procure an execution
against any stockholder for an amount equal to his stock or
to proceed by action to charge the stockholder with the
aount of the judgment, contemplates a proceeding either at
law or in equity as the circumstances may require; and that,
while the liability is a several one against such stocK-
holder, yet to avoid a multiplicity of suits a bill in
equity may be maintained against a number of stoczholders.
In American Freehold Land-Mortgage Co. v. Woodworth,
82 Fed. 269, a federal court in New YorK overruled a de-
murrer to a bill in equity in a suit by a judgment creditor
of an insolvent Kansas farm-mortgage company to enforce the
defendant's liability as a stocxholder of that corporation
under the ,ansas statute, although the insoivent corporation
was in the hands of a receiver at the time.
The case of Mechanics Savings Bank v. Fidelity Insur-
ance, Trust and Safe-Deposit Co., 87 Fed. 112, was an action
at law by a Rhode Island corporation against a Pennsylvania
corporation, as administrator of the estate of a deceased
stockholder in a Kansas investment company against which the
plaintiff had obtained a judgment in a Kansas court but upon
which execution had been returned unsatisfied. It was held
that under the provisions of the constitution and statutes of
iXansas an action at law by a single .Jdgment creditor will be
againist a single stockholder to enforce such liability. It
was also decided that the contingent liability incurred by
the deceased "when he became a stockholder did not abate upon
his death, but survived; and that upon the happening of the
event which rendered the liability absolute, his estate be-
came chargeable therewith."
In Scliffer v. Trustees of Colunbia College, 87 Fed. 166,
which was an action at law brought in a federal court in New
YorA to enforce the individual liability of the defendants
as stockholders in a kansas corporation it was said that,
"The liability of the stockholder being contractual and
transitory, the limitation of time within which such liability
shall be enforced against the person sued thereon is a
matter to be determined by the laws of the state in which
the action is broupt." Hence, the .ansas statute of
limitations would not apply in such a case. The chief deci-
ded in this case, however, was one of pleading, which was
against the plaintiff.
The United States Circuit Court for the aistrict of
Massachusetts in the case of Dexter v. Edmands, 8§ Fed.
467 (1898) decided that the Kansas statute (S32, C. 23
Gen. St. 1868) does not merely provide a remedy for the enforce-
ment of rights created by the Constitution of the state
of iansas, but creates substantive rights, which may be
enforced in other jurisdictions in accordance with the
forms of remedy there provided. The court was of the
opinion that the rights given by such a statute are neither
repugnant to the public policy of the United States, or
'j ustice or good morals, nor calculated to injure the
United States or its citizens. Thej udgment which the
plaintiff had obtained against the corporation in Kansas
was held to be conclusive of its indebtedness, being
made so Ly the statutes of the state in which the corporation
Is located.
The case of brown v. Trail, 89 Fed. 641, was an action
at law brought in a federal court in Maryland by a judgment
creditor of the Western Farm-Mortgage Trust Co., a Kansas
corporation. to charge the defendant as a stockholder in that
company, under the statute of Zansas. In the opinion it is
stated that the liability, which was sought to be enforced,
"is in the nature of a suretyship for the benefit of the
creditor, and is not an asset of the corporation, which
passes to the receiver, and it cannot be recovered by him."
It was decided that a plea that the plaintiff, at the time
his claim against the defendant accrued, was himself a stocl-
holder in the samie corporation, states a good defense to
the extent of the plaintiff's own statutory liability as
such stociKholder, but no further, as the fact of his ,eirig a
stockholder does not preclude the plaintiff from maintaining
the action for the balance remaining due him after deducting
the aiiiount of his own liability.
Thus, it is clear that the federal courts have, sofar,
uniformly decided that the indikidual liability under the
statutes ot Aansas of a stockholder of a kansas corporation
may be enforced in the federal courts.
Passing to the decisions of the state courts upon the
enforcement ol these Aansas statutes, considerable diversity
of opinion is encountered.
Examining the decisions in the different states in the
alphabetical order of the states, California comes first.
In this jurisdiction there has been, at least, one decision
upon this subject. In Ferguson v. Sherman, 116 Cal. 169,
the judgment creditor creditor of a iansas corporation
sought to enforce against California stockholders in that
corporation theirstatutory liability for the judgment debt.
The Xansas corporation was made a party defendant. The
plaintiff alle ed, in substance, that a judgment had been
obtained against the corporation in the circuit court of
the United States for the district of zkansas, and that execution
thereon had been returned wholly unsatisfied; that under the
Cbstitution and laws oi kansas execution may, under such
circumstances, be issued against any of the stockholders;
or the plaintiff in the execution may maintain an action at
law against any one or more of the stockholders, etc. The
court decided that the action could be maintained, the statute
of the state which created the corporation being the
measure of the liability of its stocKholders. The view of
the federal courts, that the contract of stockholders in a
Kansas corporation, as respects personal liability under
the kansas statute, is in the nature of a contract of
guaranty, was approved. The kansas corporation in this
case was a street railroad company and the defendants contended
that such a corporation was exempt from the operation of the
particular statutes in question, on the ground that it should
be considered a railroad corporation. But the court held
that the exemption of the stockholders of railroad corporations
from a statutory liability, by the Constitution of Xansas,
is an immunity in the nature of a grant or privilege, which is
to be construed so as to restrict rather than broaden the
grant from the state, and *as not designed to apply to stock-
holders of street railroad corporation. The court clearly
regarded the action against the stockholders to recover a debt
of the corporation as transitory in character and not a remedy
peculiar to the state of Kansas, .although it was declared
that the remedy ny execution against the stockholders after
execution against the corporation had been returned unsatisfied
is peculiar and unenforceable in other forums.
The decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois have not
been quite so favorable to creditors of Kansas corporations.
In Fowler v. Lamson, 146 111. 476, where a creditor filed a
bill allelging the recovery of a judgment against a A ansas
corporation and that execution thereon had been unsatisfied.
The plaintiff also, among other declarations, set forth the
provisions of the Kansas statutes. The court held that the
bill could not be maintained in the state of Illinois.
"Judgments have not been obtained in this state, or elsewhere,
against app6llees. The proceeding is an attempt to enforce
their individual liability as stockholders, by compelling them
to pay judgments against the corporation." The court
in discussing the remedies provided by the ansas statutes,
such as execution against the stockholders ( 32 C. 23 Gen.
St. 1868) and action against the stoc,holders after dis-
solution of a corporation, leaving debts unpaid (044)
said, "It is well settled that these special remedies
having been provided for the enforcement of the individual
liability of stoczholders created by the laws of !ansas,
they alone can be pursued to enforce that liability." Then
the court decides that this is an "insuperable obiection,"
since the rule is, that when such a special remedy is given
the liability cannot be enforced in another state.
In Tuttle v. The Nat. .ank of the Republic, 161 Ill.
497, it was held that the action at law in that case could
not be maintained in the courts of Illinois under the
facts appearing in the records. The provision of the
kansas Constitution (Art. 12, 82), providing for the
securing of dues from corporations, was construed by the
court as not self-executing, it a.-pearing from the
provision itself that legislation is contemplated as necessary
for its enforcement. It was asserted that the kansas legis-
lature has not adopted any statute declaratory of the extent
of the security of dues from corporations and as to the time
a stockholder's liability attached with reference to the
time of contractin the indebtedness; but it has only attempted
to declare the remedy- The remedies, such as execution against
the stockholders ( 32, C. 23, Gen. St. 1868) and, in case some
of the stoc-holders are unable to pay their share, making the
others liable for the deficiency (644), the court declares
to be special remedies which will not be enforced outsiae of
Kansas. In this case three justices dissented, contending
that the provision of the Aansas constitution is self-executing
and that an action to enforce th( liability is transitory.
The latest reported Illinois case on this subject, Bell v.
Farwell, 52 N. E. Rep. 346, decided in Dec. 1898, however,
holds that while the provision in the Aansas constitution
/
(Art. 12, 62) is not self-executing, the liability of stock'
holders imposed by the laws of A.ansas is contractual and
therefore can be enforced in other states. Distinguishing
this case from Tuttle v. Bank, supra,the court says, that
in the declaration in this case there are three provisions
(H32, 40, and 44, C. 23, Gen. St. 1868) of the Kansas
statutes set forth and relied upon, and, also, the con-
struction placed upon the statutes by the Supreme Court of
' ansas, which were not before the court in the Tuttle case.
The court adds, that had the statutes and their construction
by the _ansas court been before it in the Tuttle case, "a
different result might have been reached on the question
of remedy." In this case, the action was one in assum-
psit arid the court decides that uuder the circumstances a
resort to a court of equity in Lansas does not seem to be
required before bringing this action in Illinois. With
these views, the court overruled the demurrer to thee
declaration.
Massachusetts is the jurisdiction that has undoubtedly
been most frequently stated to be strongly opposed to
enforcing the liability of stockholders in Xansas corpora-
tions.
In the first Massachusetts case in which this liability
was sought to be enforced that of Bank of North Amerlc .v.
Rindge, 154 Mass. 203, the judgment creditor of a !ansas
state banx brought an action in contract against a resident
of California, who was found in Massachusetts. The
plaintiff had recoveded a judgment in sansas against the
corporation and took out execution thereon but could find
no property to levy upon. In his declaration he averred
that by the laws of kansas an execution may be issued, in
such a case, against any of the stockholders to an amount equal
to their stock or an action may be brought to charge the stock-
holders wiht the amount of the judgment. A demurrer to the
declaration was sustained. In the opinion, it is stated
that, "the declaration does not in terms set forth any
statute of Aansas, nor show to what extent the laws of ansas
above set iorth are statutory, or rest merely in judicial
decisions." The court regretted that it was not free to
determine the case upon an examination of the statute of ransas,
but felt bound to "take the case as the parties present it
to us."The court declares that, "the question can hardly be
considered as an open one in this Commonwealth", as it had
often declined to enforce liabilities of stockholders
in foreign corporations. It is urged that, if the plaintiff
in such a case without first having obtained a judgment
in Kansas establishing the defendant's liability as a
stockholder, could maintain an action directly against him
in Massachusetts then the plaintiff might a similar action
against him in any other state where service upon him could
be obtained. This would enable a dishonest creditor to
recover several times one a-ainst stockholders residing
in different states as it would be difficult for them to
ascertain what steps the plaintiff had already taken. This
might give rise to a large amount of litigation, it is
said. It is also pointed out that in case of several
actions in different states questions of priority of the
claims of various creditors might ensue, upon which the
decisions of the state courts might not be uniform, and
so the defendant might have to pay more than once. The
court seems to have thought that an action should first be
brought in the state where the corporation is established to
ascertain and determine the amount of each stockholder's
liability, and it is practically decided that as this was not
done L, this case the action could not be maintained.
But in Handcock National BanK v. Ellis, 166 Mass. 414,
where the plaintiff's declaration averred, insubstance, that
under the statute of Kansas, as construed in the highest court
of that state, the liability of the defendant as a stockholder
is contractual ard that in subscribing to the capital stock
the defendant thereby guaranteed payment to the judgment
creditors of an amount equal to the par value of the stocK owned
by him; and that an action to enforce this liability is trans-
itory, and may be brought in any court of general jurisdiction
where personal service can be made upon the stockholder, it was
held that, "the averments are sufficient to set forth that
the defendant is such a stockholder as by the law of kansas
would be liable to the plaintiff." As the case came up on
demurrer, it was decided that Judicial notice could not be ta<en
of the kansas statutes or of their interpretation by the Kan-
sas courts, but only the averments of the declaration could be
considered. The court calls attention to the fact that the
declaration in this case sets forth that according to the law
of Wansas the defendant is liable to the corporate creditor as
upon a contract, which is suable anywhere. "The facts
alledged in this respect are different froir! those in any case
heretofore presented to this court." It is conceded that
while the alledged liability is different from that which ex-
ists in Massachusetts, yet the construction which is given
in &ansas will be adopted; and "jurisdiction exists in Mass-
achusetts to enforce the liability like other debts, if the law
of Kansas is accurately stated in the declaration."
In the later case of Coffing v. Dodge, 167 Mass. 231, de-
cided in 1897, the action was in contract, with courts in tort.
One of the counts of the declaration was to enforce the de-
fendant's liability as a stocvholder in a corporation which
had guaranteed certain notes and mortgages belonging to the
plaintiff. The court decided that the ruling that the plain-
tiff could not recover upon this count was correct. The court
distinguishes this case from Banx v. Ellis, supra by stating
that in this case "there is no distinct allegation that the
liability is contractual, nor that it has been so construed by
the courts of Kansas, nor are there any allegations from which
it can be seen that no inJustice to others will be done," as
was set forth in that case.
Thus it is clear that the Massachusetts courts will not
enforce the liability of a stockholder in a -ansas corporation
unless the plaintiff properly alle'ges and shows that the
liability is contractual, that it has been so construed by
the courts of Kansas, and that no injustice can be done to the
defendant, the corporation, or other creditors or stockholders
by entertaining the action.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, in the case of Western
National BanK v. Lawrence, 76 N. W. Rep. 105, decided in 1898,
permitted a ,udgment creditor of a \arisas corporation, upon
whose judgment execution against the corporation had been re-
turned unsatisfied, to maintain an action at law in Michigan
for the purpose of charging the defendant to the amount of his
stock in the. corporation. In his declaration the plaintiff set
forth the provisions of the Constitution and statutes of
±,ansas under which it was claimed the defendant became liable.
In the opinion it is said, "We are satisfied that to enforce
this contract does not import the law of one state into another
state, and cive it an extraterritorial effect, in any proper
sense. It merely allows the law to be read for the purpose
of determining the contract into which the stockholder has
entered. The contract is expressed by the statute and what
the stockholders have written and done under it, when ta'en
and read together as a whole." It is also stated that,
"while the liability is statutory, it is one which arises on
contract of subscription to the capital stock; and an action to
enforce the same is transitory, and may be brought in any court
of general jurisdiction where personal service may be had upon
the stoc,holder."
In Missouri at least two cases, involving this question,
have arisen.
In Bagley v. Tyler, 43 Mo. App. 195, the kansas City
Court of Appeals permitted the statutory liability of a stock-
holder in a Xansas corporation to be enforced in a suit at
law. The court stated that it was immaterial what the
pleader might call the action, whether a proceeding in equity
or an action in law, as the facts were set forth which con-
stituted a good petition whether in law or in equity. The
laws ol iansas creating the liability sought to be enforced
were pleaded uy the plaintiff in his petition. In the opinion
it is asserted that the defendant's liability "grows out of
his contract to pay the unsatisfied creditor of the corporation
a sum equal to the aiiiount of stock owned. "The stockholder
of the foreinr corporation is, by virtue of his subscription,
a contracting party with the creditors thereof. The laws of
its corporate organization, as contained in the special char-
ter, or as set out in the general statutory provision under
which said foreign corporation is organized, enter into and
make the terms of the stocbkholderls engagement. This contract,
so made, will (when not immoral or opposed to the public
policy of the forum) be enforced everywhere, not ex propriore
v_igo2re but only ex comitate."
The highest court of Missouri, in Guerney v. Moore,
131 Mo. 650, allowed a ,-udgment creditor of an insolvent
Kansas corporation to recover against a stockholder in the
same, an amount equal to the amount of stock owned oy the
latter together with the amount still unpaid on hi2 shares of
stock. It was held that the liability of the defendant did
not accrue until the execution was returned no property found,
or the corporation was insolvent or dissolved. The .ansas
statute, imposing this liability was declared not to be penal
in its nature. In the opinion occurs the folloing argument:
"It does not follow that because the people of this coimon-
wealth have restricted the liarility of stockholders in cor-
porations created by virtue of our own laws to the amount of
their stock that they will refuse to enforce in their courts the
contracts of its own citi ens who voluntarily go into other
states and become stockholders in corporations under their laws
which impose upon stockholders a personal liability in excess
of the afliount of stock taKen. Such a contract is not against
public policy. It contravenes no principle of good morals and
has no mischievous tendency. It is not in any sense re-
pugnant to our ideas of honesty or justice." The court remar s
Massachusetts
that the reasoning in the Acase of Bank v. Rindge, suEra is "to
our minds entirely unsatisfactory."
In New York, the leading case of Marshall v. Sherman, 148
N. Y. 9 (1895), which was an action brought by a creditor of a
Kansas Danking corporation, which had been dissolved leaving
debts unpaid, to enforce the liability of a stockholder in that
corporation, the court sustained a demurrer to the complaint.
The complaint averred, in substance, the incorporation of the
bank under the laws of Kansas; that it had been dissolved, leaving
debts unpaid; that the defendant was a stockholder: that the
plaintiff had recovered a judgment in the courts of Kansas:
that execution thereon had been returned unsatisfied; that the
corporation was insolvent but a portion of the. debt had been
paid to plaintiff. The complaint also set forth the provisions
of the Constitution of the state of Kansas and the statutes
it
($2 and 44, C. 23, Gen. St. 1868) which was claimed im-
posed a legal liability upon the defendant to pay the money
still due. But there was no allegation as to the meaning or
effect of these statutes, of the provision of the Constitution
set fourth under the decisions of the courts of iKansas, nor any
allegation that any judgment had been obtained against the
defendant in the courts of the state under those statutes.
The defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds, among
others, that there was a defect of parties defenant, in that all
the stockholders were not made defendants, and also, that the
complaiiit did riot state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. The court under the circumstances, placed its own
construction upon the statutes and decided that the provision of
the Constitution referred to is not self-executing; and that
statutes were enacted to make it effectual and that it was these
enactments not the Constitution itself which the plaintiff
sought to enforce. It was held that the statutes set forth
in the complaint provide for a special and peculiar remedy and
were "intended to operate and be enforced only within that
jurisdiction." It was pointed out that it would be clearly im-
possible to enforce some of their provisions in New York state;
and, hence, if it was apparent that they could not as a whole
scheme be given full effect in New York, some particular pro-
vision ought not to te detached from the general context for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not it is enforceable be-
yond the local jurisdiction, but they should be construed as a
whole. It was further pointed out that in New York the lia-
bility of a stocomholder te the corporate creditors seems to be
regarded as contractual oily up to the time when the capital
stocrt has been fully paid in; and that in the case under con-
sideration the liatility could not Le said to arise upon con-
tract in the general sense, as it would not exist but for the
terms of the statute. "The voluntary purchase of the stoc by
the defendant would not of itself create any liability." And,
so, the liability in this case was held to be a secondary and
special liability, conditional upon the failure of the corpora-
tion itself which owes the debt to pay it. It was held, more-
over, that if the action could be maintained, under any circum-
stances, in New York it must be in the form and by such proced-
ure as lie liar ilities created tnder New York statutes are
enforced against New YorK citizens. But in New YorA an action
at law by a single creditor against a single stockholder for the
recovery of a certain sum of money cannot be maintained under
the New York statutes declaring the liability of stocxholders.
In such cases a suit in equity must be brought by or in behalf
of all the creditors against all the stoc'holders. Since in
this action neither the number ol stock'holders nor the ainount
of the capital stocz were stated, it was held that the equit-
able proportion of the debts which the defendant should pay
de
could not be termined. The court deemed it unfais to compel
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the defendant to pay this claim and then leave him to another
action or, perhaps, several actions in several states, to ob-
tain contriLution from the other stocxholders. To carry out
the purpose of the law there should be a proceeding in equity for
an accounting, to which all the stockholders are made parties.
Thus, it may be said that it was held in this case, that the
New YorK courts will not enforce the liability of a stockholder
in a e ansas corporation, if it appears that those statutes pro-
vide a pecular and special remedy and that it will be impossible
to do complete Justice to all the parties in intereat.
It may be well to mention, in this connection, that much
the same doctrine is adopted by one of the lower courts of
Ohio in the case of Wyatt v. Moorehead, 7 Ohio Decisions 381
(1897). In that case, the Kansas statutes were set forth in
the plaintiff's petition, among other averments it was held that
the plaintiff ought not to be permitted to enforce in Ohio the
remedy provided by the laws of kansas until a proper proceed-
ing, the relation of the insolvent corporation and its cred-
itors and stockholders had been determined, and the amount which
each solvent stockholder should contribute had been ascertained.
It was also pointed out that since the defendant is "not lia-
ble to any individual creditor, the latter ought not to be per-
mitted to recover to the full extent of the former's liability,
and compel him to institute a suit in anothes state, or it may
te several suits in several states for contribution from the
other stoc,holders.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Cush-
ing v. Perot, 175 Pa, 66, held that in an action in that state
by a foreign creditor of a Kansas corporation against a stock-
holder therein to recover the liability imposed on stock, holders
by the Kansas statutes an affidate of defense is sufficient
which avers that suit has already been brought and judgment ob-
tained against the defendant in the state where the company was
incorporated on his liability as a stockholder and execution
has been levied on his real estate there. Mr. Justice
Mitchell, in his opinion, manes this Atatement: "In regard to
the .ansas statute under consideration, my individual opinion
is that by the weight both ofqreason and authority the liability
created by it is contractual and should be enforced by any
court having jurisdiction of the parties "but as this was not
the point in issue in the case, he concludes by saying that
he leaves to be decided when they arise, the ultimate questions
whether the courts of Pennsylvania will enforce the ttatutory
liability under the ansas law, and if so, whether against
separate stockholders or only in the form provided by the
Pennsylvania practice in similar cases.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in the case of Hancoc:
Nat. Bank v. Farnum, reported in 40 Atl. Rep. 341 (1898),
sustained a demurer to a complaint in an action brought by a cred-
itor of a 4ansas Corporation against a stockholder to enforce the
latters liability. In his declaration, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant owed the plaintiff a sum of money equal to the
amount of his stock under the laws of Kansas which were set forth.
The plaintiff alleged that according to the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Aansas, the stockholder's liability is contract-
ual, several and transitory, and that, having been so decided,
under the provisions of the United States Constitution relating to
the full faith and credit being given to statutes, decrees, and
judgments of other states, this action should lie. But the
court pointed out that these opinions of courts are not judgments;
and that the portion of the opinion in Howell against Manglesdorf,
sLupra , as to the liability being statutory and in the nature of
a guarantee was really a dictum. It was asserted that even an
opinion of the Kansas court which declared the liability to be
contractual would not be binding because it would not be a judg-
ment, to which full faith and credit must be given. The court
construed the liability imposed by the , ansas statutes to be a mere
statutory liability, "incidental to ownership of stock"w rather
than a contract, which is not enforcable under the laws of Rhode
Island, and which comity did not require it to enforce.
The faxegoing seemed to be all of the cases on the enforcement
outside of the state of kansas, of the statutory liability of
stockholders in Kansas business corporations, which have risen
prior to the year 1899. For the study of these decisions it
is apparent that there is no little difference of opinion on
this questien among the courts of different jurisdictions, some
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of this diversity arising from the difference in the point of
view taken and some of it being in direct conflict. Accordingly,
a discussion of the important points involved is rendered necessary
in order to serve as a conclusion forthis investigation of the
A
decisions on the question,
CONCLUS ION.
The difference of opinion, referred to, arises over both
the nature ot the liability and the manner of its enforcement.
As to the nature of the liability, it may be said that while
the courts are agreed that the liability of a stockholder for the
debts of the corporation to the extent of the amount unpaid upon
his stock is contractual and hence should be enforced in any
jurisdiction where personal service upon the defendant may be
had, yet some courts contend that a liability to the corporate
creditors which is declared to co ntinue after the stock is fully
paid for is merely statutory and comity does not require the courts
of other states to enforce. In other jurisdictions, on the
other hand, it is held that this liability, while statutory,
in the sense that it does not exist at common law but is
imposeby statue, must be deemed to be contractual and
extra
enforceable.territorially , since it arises upon the contract of
subscription to the capital stock of the corporation, the
stockholder being considered to contract with reference to all
the provisions of the charter and statutes creating the
corporation. In some decisions it has been said that this
liability is in the nature of a contract of guaranty.
As regards those courts which construe this liability to Le
purely statutory, at least one of the cases already cited -
the Rhode Island case of Hancoci Nat'l Bani v,. Farnum, supra
seems to clearly hold that the personal liability imposed by
the Kansas statute is merely statutory, " incidental to owner-
ship of Stock" rather than contractual; and that comity does not
require it to be enforced by other states. In Marshall x.
Sherman, supra , it was pointed out that in New York, a
stockholder's liability to the corporate creditors up to the
time all of the capital stocK is paid in might be considered
contractual and that the "double" liability imposed by the Kansas
statute cannot be considered as arising upon the contract,
in the general sense.
On the other hand, several of the United States Circuit
Court decisions, and decisions from California, Michigan and
Missouri, which have been cited, declare that this liability
is contractual in nature arising upon the subscription to stocE
and may be enforced by the courts of other states than
Kansas.
Doubtless much may be said in favor of either view. From
the standpoint of the stockholders, it would seem but fair that
they should not be held liable for the debts of the corporation
beyond whatever may remain unpaid upon their subscriptions
to the capital stock. When the capital is once paid in,
those who deal ith the corporation ought to be compelled to
contract with that alone in view, and not expect to holo the
stockholders as guarantors of the payment of the corporate
debts. In fact, the corporation laws of some states, such as
Illinois and New Yori , do not hold stockholders to any personal
liability to creditors after the capital stock has been fully
paid in. To be sure, a corporation is a somewhat different
entity to deal with than a single person or a partnership,
but those vho do business with it ought to loo out for themselves
and not expect to rely upon more than the actual assets of the
corporation. One who deals with a merchant, for example,
who is conducting a business in his own name and on his own
behalf, is not permitted by statute to look to some third person
for the payment of the merchant's debts. He must look to the
property of the merchant, and if hd has been so imprudent as
to trust the merchant too far, he must bear the loss. Of
course, the wrongful acts of the officers of a corporation are
not to be excused; but there are usually statutes which particul-
arly provide for such cases, making those officers themselves
liable. Hence, much may be said in favor of the argument
that the "double" liability imposed by the Kansas statute is
purely statutory and ought not to bi enforced extraterritorially.
But, on the other hand, it seems to Ite the opinion of many
authorities that the stogkholder in subscribing to the stock
must be deemed to contemplate the law undew which the corporation
was created, and must abide by it.
As to the method prescribed for enforcing this liability
anothier important difference of opinion exists.
While it is generally conceded that the summary proceeding
to procure execution against the stockholder after return of
execution unsatisfied against the corporation is a special
remedy which will not be enforced outside of the sthte of kansas,
many of the decisions cited, such as those of the federal courts,
California, Michigan and Missouri held that the alternative
remedy of action to charge the stockholder with the amount of
the judgment wis transitory and may be brought in other jurisdict
ions than Kansas.
But in Marshall v. Sherman supra, the court construed the
Kansas statute V6$2) providing for both of these remedies as
a whole and thedeclined to separate the two remedies, holding
that tne statute provided peculiar remedies which would not be
enforced.
In most of the cases cited the action against the stock-
holder was brou-ht upon a judgment obtained in ansas obtained
against the corporation, but in one or two of the decisions
at least the court referred to the iAansas statute (644) provid-
ing for an action against the stockholders of any corporation
which had been dissolved leaving debts unpaid. In Fowler v.
Lamson, s141ra , and Tuttle v. Nat. Bank, supra, it is spoken of
as a special remedy, probably because it is provided that the
action may be brought against the stocxholders without ioining
the corporation and also in case any of the stocrholders are
unarle to pay their share of the execution the deficiency
shall be divided among the others.
It would seem ,however, that an action at law or in equity
to charge the stoczholder with the amount of the judgment
upon which execution could not t.e satisfied against the corpor-
ation, is not a peculiar or special remedy. The courts of other
states are capable of entertaining it and should give due
respect to the judgment obtained in Kansas, since the United
States Constitution provides that "full faith and credit shall
be given in each state to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other state." But, according
to the Illinois and Massachusetts decisions, the :ansas laws
creating the liability, and their judicial interpretation in
that state must be pleaded as facts.
The Kansas statute does not state whether the action
shall be brought in law or equity. While the federal courts,
and courts of California, Michigan, and Missouri have permitted
a single creditor to bring such an action at law against a
single stockholder, it is manifest that complete justice to
A
all parties interested can hardly be done in such an action.
It is possiblu for a dishonest creditor to recover the full
amount of his claim against a stockholder in one state and then
recover against the stockholders in distant states. More-
over, it would be difficult and expensive for one stocK-
holder in one state to compel contribution from other stock-
holders scattered, perhaps, throughout the country. In
Marshall v. Sherman, supra, the court suggested that a pro-
ceeding in equity for an accounting, to which all the stock-
holders are parties should be had. In this manner the prG-
perty share of the debts which each stockholder should pay
could be detemmined.
Liewise, the court in Tuttle v. Nat. Bank, supra, point-
ed out that the proper proceeding in such a case is for the
courts of the state in which the corporation existed to state
an account, wind up its affairs, and determine the relations
of the stockholders, creditors, and the corporation, to each
other, before attepting to enforce the liability of stock-
holders in other states; and then if necessary, the creditors
the
may appeal to the courts of the .Aates where other stocxholders
A
are dominciled for adequate relief.
Although the liability is a sevtjral one against each
stockholder, the federal court in the case of New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Beard, sujra, permitted a bill in equity against a
number of stockholders to be, in order to avoid multiplicity
of suits.
Perhaps, the best solution of this problem is that which
is suggested by the opinion in Cushing v. Perot, supjr_, namely
that a receiver be appointed by tht court to take chargeof the
assets and represent all parties both creditors and stock-
holders and pursue the co ,morn remedy for the benefit of all the
creditors. In this way the rights of each person might be
protected and no ono be compelled to pay more than his fair
proportion. To be sure, the authorities are by no means
reconcilable as to the right of a receiver of a corporation to
sue in behalf of the creditors to recover the statutory
liability of stockholders (1). Some of the Illinois and
(1)... ..h.n.eivers, .317a.
New Yorkt decisions seem to deny this right. The receiver can.
not do this, it is said, because this liability is not an
asset of the corporation which passes to the receiver Lut it
is an obligation which runs directly Irom the stocx hobder
to the creditor (1)s Brown v. Trail, supra, although the
court in Cushing v. Perot, supra, seems to have been cogni-
z-ant of this general rule, it accepts that, if the liability
under the Kansas statutes is contractual, then it should be
regarded as an asset for the payment of the corporate debts
and the right to sue upon it should pass to the receiver.
In conclusion, it may be said that, thus lar the greater
number of the decisions have favored the enforcement ol the
statutory liability of stockholders in Kansas corporations,
but some authority of great weight has taken an opposite
position. The arguments are not all on one side, by means,
but it may bafely be asserted that this statutory liability
is li.-ely to be enforced in most jurisdictions, if the proper
procedure is followed, except in cases where the substantive
right itself is denied.
( 1 ) . . .e . .• • • • o • * * • . * o o . . . o * o * • • * • *..••o .• . . g. • .o(1) CooK on Corporations, g218.
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